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Professor Snow has offered an original and 
illuminating analysis of compassion which, among its 
other virtues, provides a plausible account of why we 
feel compassion for animals and why it is rational to do 
so. I fully endorse her general approach, so my 
comments will not be in any wayan attempt to 
undermine or refute her analysis; instead, I wish to raise 
some questions that follow on the heels ofan acceptance 
of her account. 
To summarize very briefly: Professor Snow's 
account of compassion for animals is part of a larger 
exploration of the correct way to understand compassion 
in general. l She agrees with other analyses which claim 
that compassion requires that the individual feeling 
compassion must "identify with" the being (more 
accurately, identify with the plight of that being) for 
which compassion is felt. (In what follows, I will refer 
to the being which feels compassion as "the source" 
and the being for which compassion is felt as "the 
target.") However, she disagrees with Piper and Blum2 
about what is required for such an identification. Piper 
and Blum think that imagination is a necessary 
component of any act of identifying with, Le. that the 
source of compassion must imaginatively "project'! 
herself into the situation of the target. The problem wj.th 
this account is that demanding such an act of 
imagination, if true, would cast doubt on our ability to 
feel compassion for many nonhuman animals. 
Philosophers, at least since B.A. Farrell and 
Thomas Nagel, have noted that imaginatively 
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projecting oneself into the plight of a bat, for instance, 
may indeed be impossible.3 If so, and if compassion 
necessarily has an imaginative component, our ability 
to feel compassion for animals, especially those that 
have significantly different experiential lives than we 
do, would be severely restricted. Snow argues that her 
account of compassion would remove this restriction. 
She argues, here and elsewhere, that the source's 
having certain sorts of beliefs about the target is 
sufficient, even in the absence of any sort of 
imaginative projection. We can have-and justify-
the beliefs necessary to feel compassion even for 
animals so different from us that we cannot imagine 
what it would be like to be such a creature. 
A full, general commentary on this debate about the 
nature of compassion should start with a more detailed 
explanation of what is involved in imagining and 
imaginative projection and an account of what, if 
anything, really distinguishes it from having the right 
sorts of beliefs. While this approach might shed light 
on some aspects of Snow's general analysis and might 
even reduce the distance she tries to establish between 
her theories and imagination-based alternatives, it would 
lead us away from a specific focus on compassion 
toward animals. I will, therefore, turn to issues that bear 
more directly on an attempt to determine whether 
Snow's analysis does, in fact, give us a better and 
broader understanding ofour ability to feel compassion 
for animals. I have three general "requests for 
clarification" and then some general questions about 
how any account of compassion might affect our 
judgments about moral obligations. 
The first request for clariftcation concerns the notion 
of "identifying with." It is clear how we are to identify 
with the target of compassion on an imagination-based 
analysis: we imaginatively project ourselves into or take 
up the target's point of view. Thus, imagination provides 
both the act of identifying, and the content of the 
identification. How does identification work on Snow's 
belief-based analysis? After all, Snow retains the 
condition that the source must be able to identify with 
the target, even though it may not be able to imagine 
what being the target is like. 
Snow tells us that the various states we believe the 
target to be in need not be thought to be identical with 
any state we have experienced. That is precisely why a 
belief-based analysis allows for compassion in cases 
where the imagination-based account falls flat, cases 
in which the target is vastly different from the source 
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of compassion. Identification apparently only requires 
that the source believes that s/he is vulnerable in ways 
that are similar in some respect to the way the target is 
vulnerable, and that both are liable to misfortune. But 
does that tell us enough about what sort of identification 
is necessary or sufficient for compassion? 
On a fairly natural, but narrow or "strict," reading 
of "similarly vulnerable," it would be plausible to argue 
that I share only very limited sorts of vulnerability with 
a bird: perhaps physical pain and acute terror are the 
only sorts of vulnerabilities that we share. On this 
interpretation, the idea of similar vulnerability is 
grounded in shared experiential harms. The source's 
compassion is directed to the specific sort of suffering 
that the target is believed to be experiencing. This could 
still be much weaker than the requirements set by 
imagination-based theories: we don't have to believe 
that the bird experiences terror or the pain of a broken 
leg in exactly the same way we do, and we certainly 
don't have to be able to imagine ourselves in that 
situation. But we do have to believe that the 
vulnerabilities are in some way similar, and this narrow 
reading asks us to focus on harms that are experienced 
in a similar fashion as negative or harmful. The result 
is something that is certainly less restrictive than an 
imagination-based theory of compassion but which 
nonetheless imposes limitations on what we can feel 
compassion for. 
A different, broader reading of "similar vulner-
ability" would not put so much weight on similarity of 
experienced suffering. On this view, trees, paintings, 
species, and ecosystems, as well as sentient creatures, 
might be viewed as potential subjects of misfortune. 
They can sustain damage; something required for their 
proper functioning can be withheld; and they can die. 
Even when they do not experience these harms, the 
damage done to them is similar in other ways to threats 
to which we are also vulnerable. This broader 
perspective is consistent with Snow's suggestion that 
the idea that "existential vulnerabilities" such as death 
might afford a sufficient basis for identification. 
However, subsequent remarks suggest that this might 
be too weak a connection. 
Lacking any firm answer in Snow's account to date, 
we would have to extend the investigation to determine 
what sorts of shared vulnerabilities are in fact the most 
appropriate grounding for compassion. My preliminary 
suggestion is that the etymology of "compassion"-
"feeling with"-favors the narrow interpretation with 
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its focus on feelings and experiences. Whichever 
interpretation is selected, it is clear that we need to 
investigate more fully what the identification process 
requires and allows before we can assess the scope of 
possible feelings of compassion for animals. 
The second question has to do with Snow's claim 
that we need not rely on direct justification (e.g., 
objective, scientific demonstrations of the nature ofpain 
in a nonhuman species) in order to establish the 
legitimacy of compassion. According to her theory, 
indirect justification which relies on compassion's 
coherence with a larger network of beliefs, attitudes, 
actions, and emotions is often sufficient. It is not yet 
clear to me whether the entire feeling of compassion is 
indirectly justified, as suggested by her remarks about 
warranting the enwtion, or simply the beliefs about the 
target's states, as she seems to suggest later, when she 
alludes to "the coherence of its accompanying beliefs 
with other beliefs, emotions, values, and attitudes" 
[emphasis mine]. If it is the former, Snow would have 
imported a whole new account of compassion which is 
to be evaluated holistically, rather than as an emotion 
whose justification depends on the justification of the 
beliefs which form a necessary component. If it is the 
latter, we need some further argument as to why these 
beliefs ought to be allowed a special epistemic status, 
why they need not be held to the same standards of 
accountability as any other belief. Or, perhaps indirect 
justification is an option for all sorts of beliefs, not just 
those which form the basis for compassion. We simply 
need to know more before we can decide whether an 
appeal to indirect justification is a legitimate option. 
Questions about justification are related to our first 
area of questioning about identification with the target 
and similar vulnerability. There, we were unclear about 
the content of beliefs that were to provide the basis of 
the source's identification with the target: what did the 
source have to believe about the nature of the target's 
plight in order to feel compassion? Knowing more about 
the content of beliefs might shed light on this second 
issue as well, since questions of indirect justification 
are more easily addressed if we know more about the 
nature of the beliefs involved. This is not an attack on 
Snow's theory; it does not identify anything like a 
contradiction or fatal flaw. We simply need to know 
more about the beliefs and their content in order to 
develop the theory fully. 
This concern about what can be indirectly justified 
leads naturally into my third area of puzzlement. In her 
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paper, Snow identifies different ways of "going wrong." 
That is, in some cases, someone thinks she is feeling 
compassion, when in fact she is undergoing some other 
sort of state.4 In other cases, the source really does have 
compassion, but the compassion is irrational. Finally, 
compassion can be. real and rational, but morally 
inappropriate. Indirect as opposed to direct justification 
of the beliefs (or of the entire emotion) would make it 
much more difficult to keep this distinction sharp. The 
need for precision is likely to be especially acute in 
cases of compassion for animals, with charges of 
"anthropomorphism," silly sentimentalism, and outright 
battiness bandied about with great abandon. Thus, it 
will be important to sort out these distinctions with care. 
Finally, I would like to move past the requests for 
clarification that have concerned us to date to expand 
the scope of the discussion beyond the particulars of 
Snow's analysis. In particular, I want to close with a 
preliminary examination of the context within which 
any analysis of compassion would naturally be situated. 
Let me begin by noting that I take Snow to accept the 
view that compassion not only can move us to action 
but that it may properly function as a component of our 
moral judgments. I attribute this position to her because 
if she were to reject it, the discussion of the moral 
inappropriateness of some instances of compassion 
would make no sense. 
A more general consideration of this moral context 
prompts the question of whether compassion is ever a 
necessary condition for morally appropriate conduct.s 
Can one be truly moral without compassion? Whether 
or not it is necessary, is it ever justifiable to charge 
someone with an irrational or inappropriate failure to 
feel compassion? It seems to me that Snow's theory 
may provide more of a basis for such a charge than 
imagination-based theories. 
Surely it is possible to argue that failure to believe 
certain things is irrational; e.g., one might plausibly 
argue that someone who does not believe that dogs feel 
pain is being irrational. But if it is irrational to reject 
the beliefs (a) that dogs are sentient, (b) that this 
particular dog is suffering, and (c) that one is, oneself, 
"similarly vulnerable," it is a very short step to the 
further claim that there is something wrong with a failure 
to feel compassion for that dog. The fact that Snow's 
account does not demand the ability to imaginatively 
project oneself into the dog's situation removes an 
important possible justification/excuse for not feeling 
compassion in such a case. 
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None of my questions are intended as an attempt to 
undermine Professor Snow's analysis of compassion 
for animals. On the contrary, I believe it offers a valuable 
addition to arguments about moral obligations to 
animals. I do hope, however, that they provide a 
springboard for further discussion. 
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